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Price Leadership and Unequal Market Sharing:




We consider experimental markets of repeated homogeneous price-
setting duopolies. We investigate the effect on collusion of sequential
versus simultaneous price setting. We also examine the effect on collu-
sion of changes in the size of each subject’s market share in case both
subjects set the same price. Our results show that sequential price
setting compared with simultaneous price setting facilitates collusion,
if subjects have equal market shares or if the follower has the larger
market share. With sequential price setting, we find more collusion if
subjects have equal market shares rather than unequal market shares.
We observe more collusion if the follower has the larger market share
than if the follower has the smaller market share.
JEL Classification Codes: C73, C92, L13, L41.
Keywords: Collusion, Price Leadership, Asymmetries, Experiment.
1 Introduction
In about one third of the cartel cases prosecuted by the European Commis-
sion, the market had a price leader and (several) price followers (Mouraviev
and Rey, 2011). Examples include markets for fittings, professional video-
tape and candle wax (DG Competition, 2006, 2007, 2008). In a recent
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study, Mouraviev and Rey (2011) theoretically investigate the role of price
leadership with regard to (tacit) collusion. They allow for the possibility of
unequal market shares in case firms set the same price. They argue that
sequential price setting, compared with simultaneous price setting, facili-
tates collusion by making it easier to punish deviations by the leader, which
relaxes the incentive of the leader to deviate. Furthermore, they show that,
with sequential price setting, collusion is facilitated if the follower’s market
share is higher, in case both firms set the same price. In particular, consider-
ing a repeated duopoly model with homogeneous goods and sequential price
setting, Mouraviev and Rey demonstrate that collusion can be sustained for
any discount factor, if the follower’s market share is large enough. In con-
trast, with simultaneous price setting, collusion can only arise in equilibrium
if the discount factor is large enough (Friedman, 1971).
Inspired by Mouraviev and Rey (2011), we consider experimental mar-
kets of repeated homogeneous price-setting duopolies. We investigate the
effect on collusion of sequential versus simultaneous price setting. Further,
we examine the effect on collusion of changes in the size of each subject’s
market share in case both subjects set the same price. In particular, we
address the following two questions. First, does price leadership facilitate
collusion, for a given type of market sharing? Second, with sequential price
setting, does a larger market share of the follower facilitate collusion? There
is one related issue which we will also examine. Mouraviev and Rey (2011)
argue that market-share inequality in case firms set the same price, might
facilitate collusion with sequential price setting. But we know from standard
theory that with simultaneous price setting, market-share inequality hinders
collusion (Ivaldi et al., 2003; Motta, 2004, pp. 164–165). We also investigate
this claim in our experiment.
In our experiment we impose whether subjects set prices simultaneously
or sequentially. We exogenously impose market shares in case subjects set
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the same price, to isolate the effect of market-share inequality. With simul-
taneous price setting we consider two treatments which differ in how the
market is shared in case subjects set the same price. In one treatment the
market is shared equally, in the other unequally. With sequential price set-
ting we consider three treatments which differ in how the market is shared
in case subjects set the same price. In one treatment the market is shared
equally, in one the follower obtains the larger market share, and in one the
follower obtains the smaller market share. To the best of our knowledge, we
are the first to conduct an experiment on price leadership with homogeneous
Bertrand competition, and our experiment is the first with unequal market
sharing in case subjects set the same price.
Concerning the theory, there are two possible caveats in relation to our
experiment. First, since we focus on tacit collusion, subjects might find it
difficult to coordinate on the same collusive price. In the theoretical analyses
of collusion by Motta (2004) and Mouraviev and Rey (2011), this coordina-
tion problem does not play a role. In practice, however, the coordination
problem might be relevant, in particular in the case of simultaneous price
setting. Scherer and Ross (1990, pp. 346–347) mention that one reason to
introduce leadership in a market is indeed to facilitate tacit coordination
on the same collusive price. This coordination problem is due to the unob-
servability of the competitor’s price when one has to set her own price. A
subject who wants to coordinate on the same price or wants to undercut her
competitor, can therefore not be certain what her optimal strategy should
be. Second, the larger the market share of the follower in case firms set the
same price, the larger the difference between the collusive payoffs of the fol-
lower and leader. In the theoretical analysis of Mouraviev and Rey (2011),
the utility of one firm does not depend on the profit of the other firm, but
it might have an effect in practice. We know from the experimental litera-
ture that fairness arguments, in the sense that subjects dislike (large) payoff
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differences, matter (e.g. in the ultimatum game, see Roth, 1995; Camerer,
2003). In addition, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Albuquerque (2009)
empirically show that CEOs of firms do not only care about their absolute
performance, but also care about their relative performance. If such an effect
is relevant in our experiment, it might imply that subjects are not willing to
collude, if that would lead to too large payoff differences. Thus, an increase
in payoff differences might (partially) offset the procollusive effect identified
by Mouraviev and Rey.
In evaluating the results, we use three measures of collusion. We find
the following with regard to our two main questions. First, we find more
collusion with sequential price setting than with simultaneous price setting,
if firms have equal market shares. We also find more collusion with sequential
price setting than with simultaneous price setting if the follower has the
larger market share. However, if the follower has the smaller market share,
evidence is mixed. We argue that this can be explained in terms of the
coordination problem and fairness arguments mentioned above. Second,
with sequential price setting, a larger market share of the follower sometimes
facilitates collusion. If we compare the case where the follower has the
smaller market share with the cases where the market share of the follower
is equal to or larger than the market share of the leader, we find more
collusion in the latter cases. However, if we compare the case where the
market shares of the follower and leader equal with the case where the
follower has the larger market share, we find less collusion in the latter case.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
an overview of the related literature. Section 3 presents the experimental
design and Section 4 the theoretical predictions. Section 5 gives our results,
while Section 6 concludes. Our regression model and detailed information
on the experiment are provided in the Appendices.
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2 Related Literature
Our experiment considers price leadership and a type of asymmetric market
sharing. In this section we discuss the literature about (i) price and quantity
leadership, (ii) different types of market sharing, and (iii) different types of
asymmetries between firms.
Several experimental papers discuss price and quantity leadership. Hilden-
brand (2010) provides an extensive overview. Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) com-
pare sequential price setting with simultaneous price setting in a repeated
duopoly with heterogeneous products and symmetric firms. They find that
sequential price setting yields more collusion than simultaneous price set-
ting. Huck et al. (2001) conduct an experiment on quantity leadership in
homogeneous duopoly markets. They observe in a repeated game higher
levels of output, and thus less collusion, with sequential quantity setting
than with simultaneous quantity setting. These two experiments impose
one of the subjects to take the role of the leader, while the other subject
acts as the follower. In our experiment we do the same. Some other experi-
ments consider endogenous timing where each round consists of two stages
and subjects are allowed to choose in which stage to set their price or quan-
tity. For example, Datta Mago and Dechenaux (2009) investigate repeated
price-setting homogeneous duopolies with capacity-constrained firms. They
find more collusion when it turns out that subjects have chosen to set prices
in different stages rather than in the same stage. Furthermore, this effect
is stronger with asymmetric capacity constraints. Further, Fonseca et al.
(2006) consider repeated homogeneous duopolies where subjects announce
when to set their quantity. They find no effect on collusion between these
two cases. Other related experiments are Huck et al. (2002) and Fonseca et
al. (2005). In summary, we see that sequential price setting facilitates collu-
sion, while sequential quantity setting hinders collusion. With endogenous
timing, there is more collusion when it turns out that subjects have chosen
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to set prices in different stages rather than in the same stage, while there is
no such effect for quantity setting.
Some experiments consider different types of market sharing. Puzzello
(2008) investigates the effect on collusion of two different tie-breaking rules
in case firms set the same price in a homogeneous duopoly with simulta-
neous price setting and capacity-constrained firms. She considers a share
tie-breaking rule where the market is shared equally, and a random tie-
breaking rule where each firm is selected with the same probability to sup-
ply the market first. The random tie-breaking rule implies unequal market
sharing ex post, but ex ante payoffs do not differ between the two rules.
Puzzello finds more collusion with the share tie-breaking rule than with the
random tie-breaking rule. On the other hand, Davis and Wilson (2002) find
no difference in collusion between these two tie-breaking rules in an auction
with homogeneous goods and four capacity-constrained sellers per market.
Thus, evidence on the effect on collusion of asymmetric market sharing is
mixed. In our experiment we impose unequal market shares in a number of
treatments. However, our firms are not capacity constrained.
A number of experiments focus on different types of asymmetries between
firms. Mason et al. (1992) investigate quantity-setting duopolies with a
homogeneous good. Each firm has either low or high constant marginal
cost. The authors find more collusion if firms have equal marginal costs
than if firms have different marginal costs. Dugar and Mitra (2009) vary
the size of the marginal cost asymmetry in homogeneous Bertrand-duopolies
under fixed matching of subjects and random assignment of marginal costs
in every round. They find more collusion if the difference between the two
possible values of marginal costs is smaller.1 Phillips et al. (2011) examine
heterogeneous quantity-setting duopolies and different marginal costs. They
find more collusion if firms have equal marginal costs than if firms have
1This result is confirmed by Dugar and Mitra (2013) in the same experimental setup
with random matching of subjects and fixed marginal costs.
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different marginal costs. They find no difference in collusion if the difference
between the possible values of marginal costs is smaller. Argenton and
Mu¨ller (2012) investigate the effect of firms with different (convex) cost
structures in price-setting duopoly markets with homogeneous goods. They
find no difference in collusion if firms have the same cost structure or different
ones. Finally, Fonseca and Normann (2008) analyze duopolies and triopolies
with price competition and homogeneous goods. Firms have symmetric or
asymmetric capacity constraints. Holding the number of firms constant,
they find more collusion with equal capacity constraints. In summary, we
see that asymmetric costs or asymmetric capacity constraints in general
hinder collusion. In our experiment firms have no capacity constraints, no
fixed costs and marginal costs are normalized to zero.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of a repeated price-setting duopoly game where
subjects sell a homogeneous good. Demand is inelastic and normalized to
unity. Costs are normalized to zero. Every subject participates in a number
of duopolies which are called matches. Each match has the same structure.
During one match a subject plays with the same competitor. Every match
consists of a randomly-determined number of rounds. Following Roth and
Murnighan (1978), we simulate an infinitely repeated game by implementing
a given continuation probability after every round.2 With probability δ ∈
(0, 1), two subjects play another round with each other. With probability
1 − δ, the current match ends. This implies that the expected number of
rounds in a match is 11−δ . We impose a continuation probability of δ = 0.70,
which is common knowledge among subjects. Each pair is therefore expected
2This setup is also implemented in the experiments of, amongst others, Dal Bo´ (2005),
Blonski et al. (2011), Dal Bo´ and Fre´chette (2011), Bigoni et al. (2012) and Cason et al.
(2013).
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to be matched for 313 rounds.
3
We run five treatments which differ in two dimensions: subjects set
prices simultaneously or sequentially in each round; and the market is shared
equally or unequally in case subjects set the same price. Our treatments with
simultaneous price setting consist of two stages in each round. In stage 1,
subjects choose their prices simultaneously and independently. In stage 2,
subjects learn the price chosen by their competitor and profits are realized.
Our treatments with sequential price setting consist of three stages in each
round. In stage 1, the leader chooses her price. In stage 2, the follower
learns the price chosen by the leader. Subsequently, the follower chooses her
own price. In stage 3, the leader learns the price chosen by its competitor
and profits are realized.
In every round, subjects choose a price from the set {3, 4, . . . , 12}. The
prices 1 and 2 are excluded to ensure uniqueness of the equilibrium in the
one-shot game (see also Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000). If a subject sets
the lowest price, she4 captures the entire market and makes profit equal
to her price. If subjects set the same price, the division of the market
depends on the treatment. To isolate the effect of market-share inequality
and to simplify the experiment, we exogeneously impose market shares in
case subjects set the same price.5
In SimEqual we have simultaneous price setting and each subject ob-
tains a share of 50% of the market in case subjects set the same price. In
all other treatments we have two different types of players, A and B. Half of
the subjects were randomly assigned to role A and the other half to role B.
Subjects kept their role throughout the session. In each match an A-player
was matched with a B-player. In the other treatment with simultaneous
3Appendix B provides the actual number of rounds played in each match in each session.
4We refer to a subject as “she”.
5This is a difference between our experimental setup and Mouraviev and Rey’s (2011)
theoretical model: they assume that firms can share the market as they wish in case they
charge the same price.
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price setting, SimUnequal, subject A obtains a share of 30% of the mar-
ket while subject B obtains a share of 70%, in case both players charge the
same price.6 In the treatments with sequential price setting, subject A is the
price leader while subject B is the price follower. We have three treatments
with sequential price setting which differ in how the market is shared in case
subjects set the same price. In Follower30 the follower obtains a share of
30% of the market while the leader obtains a share of 70%. In Follower50
each subject obtains a share of 50% of the market. In Follower70 the fol-
lower obtains a share of 70% of the market while the leader obtains a share
of 30%.
Information on the reasons of implementing unequal market shares is not
provided to the subjects in our experiment. However, they were presented
the structure of profits and a payoff table. The treatments are summarized
in Table 1.
Table 1: Treatment characteristics.
Treatment Price setting Market shares in case subjects set the same price








Follower50 Equal 50% 50%
Follower70 Unequal 30% 70%
In the treatments with sequential price setting subject A is the price leader while subject
B is the follower.
Once a match ends, subjects are matched to create new duopolies. All
treatments, except SimEqual, used an absolute typed stranger design, i.e.
6From the ultimatum game literature it is known that payoff differences matter (Roth,
1995; Camerer, 2003). In the ultimatum game, one of two subjects proposes a division of
a fixed amount of money. The other subject, the responder, either accepts or rejects this
proposal. If she accepts, the money is divided according to the proposal. If the responder
rejects, each receives nothing. Oosterbeek et al. (2004) find in their meta analysis of the
ultimatum game that the probability of acceptance increases in the percentage of money
offered to the responder. Furthermore, most offers below 20% are not accepted. We
presume that in our experiment the smallest share should be above 20%, but also not too
close to 50%. We decided to set the smallest market share at 30%.
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each A-player was matched exactly once to each B-player and vice versa.
Therefore, the total number of matches in a session is P2 , where P is the
number of subjects in a session. Since we had 16 or 18 subjects in each ses-
sion, 8 or 9 matches were being played. In SimEqual an absolute stranger
design was used. Because there is a maximum of 9 matches in the other
treatments, we randomly matched each subject in SimEqual to 9 unique
other subjects. Therefore, all sessions had the same expected total number
of rounds.
4 Equilibrium
In this section we discuss the theoretical properties of the model behind
our experiment. In Section 4.1 we discuss simultaneous price setting and in
Section 4.2 sequential price setting. We present our hypotheses in Section
4.3.
4.1 Simultaneous Price Setting
First, consider the one-shot game with simultaneous price setting. In case
both firms set the same price, firm i ∈ {1, 2} receives a given share αi ∈ (0, 1)
of the aggregate profit, where α1 + α2 = 1. In the one-shot Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium both firms set a price pN = 3, i.e. the lowest possible
price. We refer to this as the “competitive equilibrium” and “competitive
price”, respectively. Since we have inelastic unit demand and zero costs, the
corresponding aggregate competitive profit is given by
piN ≡ pN = 3. (1)
Firm i receives a profit αip
N in the competitive equilibrium.
Next, suppose that both firms set a collusive price pC ∈ {4, . . . , 12},
which is larger than the competitive price.7 The corresponding aggregate
7Note that all prices above the competitive price are collusive, but the collusive price
pC = 12 Pareto dominates all other collusive prices.
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collusive profit is given by
piC ≡ pC . (2)
Firm i receives profit αip
C if firms collude. In the one-shot game, a collusive
price cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the (infinitely) repeated game. We assume
that firms use grim trigger strategies (Friedman, 1971). Then, each firm will
set a collusive price pC in every round as long as no firm has deviated from
this price. After a deviation, firms revert to the one-shot Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium forever. More formally, we define V C(αi) as firm i’s value in
case both firms set a collusive price pC in each round, i.e.
V C(αi) ≡ αipi
C
1− δ . (3)
Consider a unilateral deviation, and suppose that the optimal deviation
yields deviation profit piD. Note that by deviating, the firm will supply the
whole market and, therefore, receive all profit in that round. However, in
future rounds firm i receives its share αi of the aggregate competitive profit
(1). Therefore, the value of a unilateral deviation for firm i is
V D(αi) ≡ piD + δ
1− δαipi
N . (4)
Firm i will not deviate if and only if V C(αi) ≥ V D(αi), i.e.
αipi
C





which results in the critical discount factor
δ ≥ δsim (αi) ≡ pi
D − αipiC
piD − αipiN . (6)
An equilibrium that sustains collusion exists if and only if both firms are
willing to collude, i.e. if and only if δ ≥ max {δsim (α1) , δsim (α2)}. From
(6) it follows that ∂δsim∂αi < 0, and therefore collusion is sustainable with
simultaneous price setting if and only if
δ ≥ δsim (min {α1, α2}) . (7)
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Thus, the discount factor of the smallest firm is most stringent (cf. Motta,
2004, pp. 164–165), i.e. an increase in market-share inequality makes collu-
sion less stable.
4.2 Sequential Price Setting
Next, take the model with sequential price setting. Considering the one-shot
game, in case both firms set the same price, the leader obtains a given share
αL ∈ (0, 1) of the aggregate profit and the follower’s share is αF = 1 − αL.
In the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium both firms set a price pN = 3. In
case both firms set the competitive price, the leader receives the competitive
profit αLp
N , and the follower the competitive profit αF p
N . Similarly, if
firms collude on the same price pC ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 12}, the leader receives the
collusive profit αLp
C , and the follower the collusive profit αF p
C . In the
one-shot game, a collusive price cannot be sustained as an equilibrium since
any collusive price by the leader will be undercut in the same round by the
follower and, therefore, the leader will set the competitive price.
Next, we examine the (infinitely) repeated game and assume again that





1− δ , (8)
whereas the follower’s value of colluding is
V C(αF ) =
αFpi
C
1− δ . (9)
Consider a unilateral deviation by the leader. If the leader deviates, this is
immediately noticed and punished by the follower. The follower undercuts
the leader’s deviation in the same round, implying that the leader will not
obtain any profit in that round. Consecutively, in future rounds the leader
receives its share αL of the aggregate competitive profit. A deviation by the
12






The leader thus prefers to collude since its incentive compatibility constraint
is always satisfied.
Next, consider a unilateral deviation by the follower. The follower’s opti-
mal deviation yields deviation profit piD. Since firms use grim trigger strate-
gies, a deviation by the follower will be followed by both firms reverting to
the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium from the next round onward. Thus,
in future rounds the follower receives its share αF of aggregate competitive
profit, and the value of a unilateral deviation of the follower is





With sequential price setting, an equilibrium sustaining collusion exists if
and only if V C(αF ) ≥ V D(αF ), i.e.
αFpi
C





which results in the critical discount factor
δ ≥ δseq (αF ) ≡ pi
D − αFpiC
piD − αFpiN . (13)
From (13), it follows that
∂δseq
∂αF
< 0. Thus, increasing the follower’s market
share decreases the critical discount factor (cf. Mouraviev and Rey, 2011),
and hence facilitates collusion.
4.3 Hypotheses
Proceeding, we examine when, according to theory, collusion is sustainable
in our experiment. Given the collusive price pC and our discrete price set, the
optimal deviation price is pD = pC−1. For each treatment we determine for
all possible collusive prices pC ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 12} the critical discount factors
13
Table 2: Overview of treatments and theoretical implications for δ = 0.70.
Treatment Market shares Critical discount factor Collusion
(min) (max) sustainable?
SimEqual α1 = 0.50 α2 = 0.50 δsim(0.50) ≈ 0.526 0.667 yes
SimUnequal α1 = 0.30 α2 = 0.70 δsim(0.30) ≈ 0.733 0.857 no
Follower30 αL = 0.70 αF = 0.30 δseq(0.30) ≈ 0.733 0.857 no
Follower50 αL = 0.50 αF = 0.50 δseq(0.50) ≈ 0.526 0.667 yes
Follower70 αL = 0.30 αF = 0.70 δseq(0.70) ≈ 0.222 0.292 yes
Critical discount factors are calculated for all collusive prices pC ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 12}. The
minimum and maximum of these values are presented in columns four and five.
derived in (6) and (13). The minimum and maximum of these critical dis-
count factors are given in Table 2. The critical discount factors are smaller
than the continuation probability δ = 0.70 in SimEqual, Follower50 and
Follower70. Therefore, collusion is sustainable in these treatments. In
SimUnequal and Follower30 the critical discount factors are larger than
the continuation probability and, therefore, collusion is not sustainable in
those treatments.
These theoretical predictions are based on the implicit assumptions that
subjects are fully rational, risk neutral, and able to coordinate perfectly on
any (collusive) equilibrium. The model, however, is parsimonious in reality
due to, e.g., risk aversion. We thus do not expect that there will always
be collusion whenever δ is larger than the critical discount factor; neither
do we expect that there will never be collusion whenever δ is smaller than
it. Instead, we take a more pragmatic approach and focus on the tightness
of the incentive compatibility constraints (see also Bigoni et al., 2012). We
make the assumption that it is more difficult to sustain collusion with tighter
constraints and, thereby, makes collusion less likely to occur. An incentive
compatibility constraint is tighter if the difference between the values of
colluding and deviating is smaller.
We first rank the treatments based on the tightest incentive compati-
bility constraint within each treatment. With simultaneous price setting,
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this is the constraint of the subject with the smallest market share. With
sequential price setting, it is the constraint of the follower. The tightness
of these constraints is reflected in the size of the critical discount factors
in columns four and five of Table 2. The range of the critical discount
factor of SimUnequal and Follower30 is identical, and highest among
all treatments. The range of the critical discount factor of Follower70
is lowest among all treatments. Finally, the range of the critical discount
factor of SimEqual and Follower50 is the same, and at an intermediate
level among all treatments. Thus, we see that the constraints are (i) tight-
est in SimUnequal and Follower30, (ii) less tight in SimEqual and
Follower50, and (iii) least tight in Follower70.
Proceeding, we refine our ranking of the treatments using the least re-
strictive incentive compatibility constraint within a treatment. With simul-
taneous price setting, this is the constraint of the subject with the larger
market share. With sequential price setting, it is the constraint of the leader.
Recall that the leader always prefers to collude and, therefore, her constraint
is never binding. With simultaneous price setting, the constraint of the sub-
ject with the larger market share is binding and, therefore, tighter than the
constraint of the leader with sequential price setting.
We now present hypotheses in order to answer our two main questions.
To investigate whether price leadership facilitates collusion for a given type
of market sharing, we have:
Hypothesis 1 (Effect of Price Leadership). There is more collusion with
sequential price setting than with simultaneous price setting, irrespective of
the allocation of market shares in case firms set the same price.
To examine whether, with sequential price setting, a larger market share of
the follower facilitates collusion, we consider:
Hypothesis 2 (Effect of Follower’s Market Share). Suppose that sub-
jects set prices sequentially. Then there is more collusion if the market share
15
of the follower is larger (in case subjects set the same price).
Ultimately, as a benchmark, we also investigate whether, with simulta-
neous price setting, market-share inequality hinders collusion. Therefore,
we have:
Hypothesis 3 (Effect of Unequal Market Sharing). Suppose that sub-
jects set prices simultaneously. Then there is more collusion with market-
share equality than with market-share inequality (in case subjects set the
same price).
5 Results
The experiment has been conducted at the Groningen Experimental Eco-
nomics Laboratory (GrEELab) at the University of Groningen in 2012. A
total of 176 subjects participated which were all students at that Faculty
(98.3%) or at other faculties of that university (1.7%). Every session con-
sisted of one treatment and lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. Every treat-
ment was run twice. Treatments were randomly assigned to sessions, and
either 16 or 18 subjects participated in a session.
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Printed
instructions were provided and read aloud.8 Subjects first had to answer a
number of questions correctly on their computer to ensure understanding of
the experiment.
Subjects were paid their cumulative earnings in euros at a rate of e0.07
per point, including an initial endowment of 75 points. Average earnings
were e11.49 and ranged from e7.30 to e24.60. Detailed information on each
session, including the number of rounds played in each match, and average,
minimum and maximum earnings, is provided in Appendix B.
8Appendix D reproduces instructions for Follower70. Instructions for other treat-
ments are similar and available upon request.
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5.1 Measures of Collusion
We measure collusion in three different ways. First, we consider the inci-
dence of economic collusion, i.e. the percentage of markets where, in a
given round, the actual market price exceeds the competitive price pN = 3.
Figure 1 shows the incidence of economic collusion over time for each treat-
ment.9 All treatments are highly economically collusive in the first round. In
Figure 1: Incidence of economic collusion per round (average across all active
groups).
SimEqual, Follower50 and Follower70 the incidence is roughly stable
over time, while there seems to be a decreasing time trend in SimUnequal
and Follower30.
Second, we consider the incidence of price coordination. This is
the percentage of markets where, in a given round, both subjects charge
9Averages are calculated per round over all active groups. Note that the number of
active groups is not constant over rounds.
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the same collusive price pC ∈ {4, 5, . . . , 12}.10 This is a stricter measure
than the incidence of economic collusion. Figure 2 shows the incidence
of price coordination over time for each treatment. In most treatments
Figure 2: Incidence of price coordination per round (average across all active
groups).
the incidence of price coordination in each round is much lower than the
incidence of economic collusion, but in Follower50 they are close to each
other. Hence, in that case, economic collusion is frequently accompanied by
price matching.
Third, we investigate the magnitude of market prices. Figure 3 shows
the average price path for each treatment. Market prices in the treatments
10There are a few markets where subjects manage to take turns in supplying the market
by alternating in prices. Results remain qualitatively the same when we include price
alternation in our definition of price coordination. We also obtain qualitatively similar
results if we focus on coordination on the highest collusive price of 12, which is a stricter
measure of price coordination.
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Figure 3: Market price per round (average across all active groups).
with sequential price setting are almost always higher than in the treatments
with simultaneous price setting. Again, there seems to be a decreasing time
trend in SimUnequal and Follower30.
We will next discuss the results for each hypothesis.11 Comparing the
relevant treatments in a pairwise fashion, all statistical tests reported below
are for the no-treatment effect versus the two-sided alternative, as outlined
in Appendix A.
5.2 Effect of Price Leadership
First, we examine Hypothesis 1. We begin with the scenario where subjects
have equal market shares in case they set the same price. Hypothesis 1 then
11We include data from all matches and all rounds. In order to examine the existence of
possible learning effects in the first matches, we also considered our results if we exclude
the first one or two matches. Our results remain qualitatively the same in that case.
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implies more collusion in Follower50 than in SimEqual. Table 3 reports
on these treatments. We obtain the following result.
Table 3: Comparison of SimEqual and Follower50 (across all rounds
and active groups).
SimEqual Follower50
Economic Collusion 59.9% ≈ 68.5%
Price Coordination 15.4% <∗∗∗ 54.4%
Market Price 4.52 <∗∗∗ 7.32
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<),
significantly higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right.
Differences between treatments are tested using regressions with clustered standard errors
on group level as outlined in Appendix A. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 0.1% level.
Result 1a (Effect of Price Leadership). There is more collusion in
Follower50 than in SimEqual, when measured by the incidence of price
coordination or the level of market prices.
Hence, for two out of three measures of collusion we find support for Hy-
pothesis 1 when subjects have equal market shares (in case they set the same
price). The incidence of economic collusion is also higher in Follower50
than in SimEqual, but there the difference is not significant.
Next, consider the scenario where subjects have unequal market shares
in case they set the same price. Hypothesis 1 then implies more collusion
in both Follower30 and Follower70 than in SimUnequal. Table 4
reports on these treatments. We have the following result.
Result 1b (Effect of Price Leadership).
a. There is more collusion in Follower70 than in SimUnequal, for
all three measures of collusion.
b. There is more collusion in Follower30 than in SimUnequal, when
measured by the level of market prices. However, there is more col-
lusion in SimUnequal than in Follower30, when measured by the
incidence of economic collusion.
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Table 4: Comparison of SimUnequal with Follower30 and Fol-
lower70 (across all rounds and active groups).
Follower30 SimUnequal Follower70
Economic Collusion 42.7% <∗ 52.4% <∗ 64.3%
Price Coordination 14.3% ≈ 13.2% <∗∗∗ 28.7%
Market Price 5.14 >∗∗∗ 4.07 <∗∗∗ 6.04
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<),
significantly higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right.
Differences between treatments are tested using regressions with clustered standard errors
on group level as outlined in Appendix A. ∗ denotes significance at the 5% level; ∗∗∗ at
0.1%.
Hence, when the follower has the larger market share we find strong support
for Hypothesis 1. However, when the follower has the smaller market share,
evidence is mixed. We find support for Hypothesis 1 using market prices as a
measure of collusion, but the hypothesis is rejected using economic collusion
as a measure.
A possible explanation for this mixed result is the following. We dis-
tinguish two different effects. First, consider the subject with a market
share of 30% in case subjects set the same price. In Follower30, a fol-
lower who wants to undercut the leader can simply set a price that is one
unit lower than the leader’s price.12 In SimUnequal, a subject who aims
to undercut her competitor, cannot observe the other’s price. Therefore,
she will be more careful and generally set a somewhat lower price than her
counterpart in Follower30. This implies an upward pressure on prices in
Follower30 vis-a`-vis SimUnequal.13 It does not affect the incidence of
economic collusion in either treatment, as long as subjects still set a price
above 3.
12The leader sets a collusive price in 46.7% of the cases in Follower30. Subsequently,
the follower undercuts optimally in 64.2% of these cases while the follower matches the
leader’s price in 30.6% of these cases.
13In SimUnequal 64.6% of the subjects with the smaller market share and 63.5% of the
subjects with the larger market share set a collusive price. In those cases, the prices 4–7
are chosen by 84.0% of the subjects with the smaller market share and by 85.5% of the
subjects with the larger market share. When a collusive price is chosen in Follower30,
a price in this range is chosen by 49.8% of the leaders and by 41.8% of the followers.
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Second, consider the subject with a market share of 70% in case subjects
set the same price. In Follower30 it turns out that many leaders set a
price equal to 3.14 Presumably, these leaders reason that if they would set a
price larger than 3, the follower would not be willing to match this price and
thus accept only 30% of the corresponding collusive profit while the leader
would obtain the remaining 70%. Hence, these leaders anticipate the follow-
ers to use a fairness argument in the sense that followers dislike outcomes
where they receive (much) less than the leader, and instead prefer to un-
dercut the leader’s price. This fairness argument is related to the finding in
the ultimatum game literature that many subjects dislike payoff differences
(Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003), and in particular dislike it when they receive
less than others (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In SimUnequal the fairness
argument is less pervasive because it is more uncertain who will supply the
market. This is due to the unobservability of the competitor’s price when
one has to set her own price. If the subject with a market share of 70% would
draw her price from the same distribution as the subject with a market share
of 30%, then in expectation the subjects would share the market equally and
hence fairness arguments do not play a role. This is indeed what we observe
in our experiment.15 Hence, in SimUnequal fairness is less of an issue than
in Follower30. This implies a downward pressure on both prices and the
incidence of economic collusion in Follower30 vis-a`-vis SimUnequal.
Combining the two arguments above, we obtain an unambiguously nega-
tive effect on economic collusion in Follower30 in comparison with SimUnequal,
which is confirmed by our results. However, the two arguments imply coun-
tervailing effects on the size of the market price. We find the first upward
14In Follower30 the leader set the minimum price in 53.3% of the cases. In
SimUnequal 35.4% of the subjects with the smaller market share and 36.5% of the sub-
jects with the larger market share set a price equal to 3.
15In SimUnequal, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions
indicates that the distribution of prices chosen by the subject with the smaller market
share is not significantly different from the distribution of prices chosen by the subject
with the larger market share (p-value = 0.999).
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effect to be dominating.
The absence of a fairness argument in SimUnequal also explains why
our results support Hypothesis 1 when we compare SimUnequal with Fol-
lower70. In Follower70 the follower obtains a share of 70% of the col-
lusive profit if she matches the leader’s price. Leaders therefore anticipate
that the followers are willing to match a high collusive price set by them.
5.3 Effect of Follower’s Market Share
Second, we examine Hypothesis 2. It implies more collusion in Follower70
than in both Follower50 and Follower30, and more collusion in Fol-
lower50 than in Follower30. Table 5 reports on these treatments. Note
Table 5: Comparison of Follower30, Follower50 and Follower70
(across all rounds and active groups).
Follower30 Follower50 Follower70 Follower30
Economic Collusion 42.7% <∗∗∗ 68.5% ≈ 64.3% >∗∗∗ 42.7%
Price Coordination 14.3% <∗∗∗ 54.4% >∗∗∗ 28.7% >∗∗∗ 14.3%
Market Price 5.14 <∗∗∗ 7.32 >∗∗ 6.04 >∗∗ 5.14
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<),
significantly higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right.
Differences between treatments are tested using regressions with clustered standard errors
on group level as outlined in Appendix A. ∗∗ denotes significance at the 1% level; ∗∗∗ at
0.1%.
that Follower30 is listed twice in this table, to facilitate all pairwise com-
parisons. We obtain the following result.
Result 2 (Effect of Follower’s Market Share).
Suppose that subjects set prices sequentially.
a. There is more collusion in both Follower70 and Follower50 than
in Follower30, for all three measures of collusion.
b. There is less collusion in Follower70 than in Follower50, when
measured by the incidence of price coordination or the level of market
prices.
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Hence, we find that the effect on collusion of a larger market share of the
follower is an inverted u-shape: we find more collusion if subjects have equal
market shares rather than unequal market shares, but we observe more
collusion if the follower has the larger market share than if the follower has
the smaller market share. We thus find strong support for Hypothesis 2
when the follower’s market share changes from 30% to 50% or from 30%
to 70%. However, when the follower’s market share changes from 50% to
70%, we reject Hypothesis 2 for both the incidence of price coordination
and the level of market prices as measures of collusion.16 The incidence of
economic collusion is also higher in Follower50 than in Follower70,
but the difference is not significant.
The result of Follower50 versus Follower70 can be understood as
follows. Figure 4 shows the price chosen by the leader in all rounds per
treatment with sequential price setting.17 For each treatment, the size of
each vertical bar shows which percentage of leaders has set the corresponding
price. Within each bar we indicate, respectively, which percentage of the
followers has set a higher price than the leader, has matched the leader’s
price, or has set a lower price than the leader. We first investigate the level of
market prices. Here, a fairness argument can explain why market prices are
higher in Follower50 than in Follower70. Suppose that the follower
will always match the price of the leader. In Follower50, there will then
be no difference in profits between follower and leader. On the other hand,
in Follower70 the difference in profit received by both subjects is 40% of
the chosen price. If the leader wants the absolute difference in profit not to
be too large, she can empower this by charging a lower price.18 This implies
16This result is, however, in accordance with Puzzello (2008) who also found more
collusion if the market is shared more equally, although theory predicted no difference
between equal and unequal market sharing there.
17Appendix C provides a complete overview of the prices chosen by the leader and the
follower in each treatment.
18Note that the leader intentionally hurts himself by charging a lower price. From Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) we know that subjects are willing to punish other subjects, even if
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Figure 4: Distribution of leader’s prices and follower’s responses with se-
quential price setting (across all rounds and active groups).
a downward pressure on prices in Follower70 vis-a`-vis Follower50. It
appears that the leader’s average price in Follower70 is lower than in
Follower50 (6.37 and 7.48, respectively, p = 0.133).
Second, we investigate the incidence of price coordination. Consider the
follower in a given round. She might consider her current profit to be too
low if she would match the price of the leader. In particular, she might even
be willing to sacrifice current profit by setting a higher price than the leader,
thereby showing that she is interested in higher prices in future rounds. Since
(future) profits are increasing in the follower’s market share, we expect this
effect to be stronger in Follower70 than in Follower50 which is con-
firmed in our experiment.19 Furthermore, we also see that more followers
this is costly for themselves.
19In Follower70 20.6% of followers set a price higher than the leader’s price, while in
Follower50 this is done by only 8.4% of the followers (values are significantly different
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undercut in Follower70 than in Follower50.20 A possible explanation
for this is the following, where we distinguish between two types of followers.
Consider the type of follower in a given round, who has set a higher price
than the leader in the previous round. Then, irrespective of whether the
leader has increased her price in comparison to the previous round, a num-
ber of these followers undercut the leader21 to compensate their sacrificed
profits of the previous round. Next, consider another type of follower in a
given round. In Follower50, the difference in follower’s profit between
matching and undercutting the price of the leader is 50%. In Follower70
this difference is 30% and, thus, smaller than in Follower50. Further-
more, the difference in leader’s profit is smaller in Follower70 than in
Follower50. This implies that, based on a fairness argument, the addi-
tional disutility of undercutting instead of matching the price of the leader is
smaller in Follower70 than in Follower50. Therefore, followers might
be less reluctant to undercut the price of the leader in Follower70 than
in Follower50.
5.4 Effect of Unequal Market Sharing with Simultaneous
Price Setting
Ultimately, we examine Hypothesis 3. It implies more collusion in SimE-
qual than in SimUnequal. Table 6 reports on these treatments. We obtain
the following result.
Result 3 (Effect of Unequal Market Sharing). There is more collusion
in SimEqual than in SimUnequal, when measured by the level of market
prices.
at 1%).
20In Follower70 30.9% of the followers undercut, while in Follower50 only 14.0%
of the followers do this (values are significantly different at 1%).
21In Follower70 7.9% (of 30.9%) of the followers undercut the leader after having
set a higher price than the leader in the previous round. In Follower50 only 0.6% (of
14.0%) of the followers do this.
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Table 6: Comparison of SimEqual and SimUnequal (across all rounds
and active groups).
SimEqual SimUnequal
Economic Collusion 59.9% ≈ 52.4%
Price Coordination 15.4% ≈ 13.2%
Market Price 4.52 >∗ 4.07
Entries between values indicate whether the value to the left is significantly lower (<),
significantly higher (>), or does not differ significantly (≈) from the value to the right.
Differences between treatments are tested using regressions with clustered standard errors
on group level as outlined in Appendix A. ∗ denotes significance at the 5% level.
Hence, for one out of three measures of collusion we find support for Hy-
pothesis 3. The incidence of economic collusion and the incidence of price
coordination are also higher in SimEqual than in SimUnequal, but the
differences are not significant.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we considered experimental markets of repeated homogeneous
price-setting duopolies. We investigated the effect on collusion of sequential
versus simultaneous price setting. We also examined the effect of changes
in the size of each subject’s market share in case both subjects set the same
price. In particular, we addressed the following two questions.
First, does price leadership facilitate collusion, for a given type of market
sharing? Our findings provide evidence that price leadership facilitates col-
lusion, if subjects have equal market shares in case they set the same price.
With unequal market shares, price leadership facilitates collusion only if the
follower has the larger market share. Evidence is mixed if the follower has
the smaller market share.
Second, with sequential price setting, does a larger market share of the
follower facilitate collusion? This is partially confirmed in our experiment.
If we compare the case where the follower has the smaller market share with
the cases where the market share of the follower is equal to or larger than
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the market share of the leader, we find more collusion in the latter cases.
However, if we compare the case where the market shares of the follower and
leader equal with the case where the follower has the larger market share,
we find less collusion in the latter case.
Our results which contradict our expectations, might be explained in
terms of the coordination problem and fairness arguments. This latter effect
does not only exist in the experimental laboratory, but also exists in real
markets. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) and Albuquerque (2009) empirically
show that CEOs of firms do not only care about their absolute performance,
but also care about their relative performance.
Based on our results, we believe that antitrust authorities should scru-
tinize markets with price leadership, since price leadership is a possible in-
dication of collusion. Furthermore, markets where firms share the market
equally are also more susceptible of collusion. With price leadership, there
is more collusion in markets where the follower has the larger market share,
than if the follower has the smaller market share.
We mention some open questions which would be interesting for further
research. In our experiment we impose whether a firms is the leader or the
follower. We can also impose firms to take turns in being the leader, as hap-
pened in, e.g., the Australian gasoline market (Wang, 2009). In that case,
the effect on collusion of an increase in the follower’s market share might be
different, because the fairness argument is less strong than in our current
setup. Further, we are also interested whether subjects will be able to co-
ordinate on a collusive outcome in a setting with endogenous timing, where
subjects are allowed to choose in which stage to set their price. Another
open question is whether price leadership facilitates collusion if subjects
can communicate. We know that communication leads to more collusion in
oligopolies with simultaneous price setting (Fonseca and Normann, 2012),
but the effect with sequential price setting is not investigated yet. Finally,
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it remains to be seen what the effect is on collusion if a subject’s payoff
depends on her own and her competitor’s profit, which would also decrease





Subjects had to decide which price to charge in every round. Because sub-
jects of a group possibly interact with each other for several rounds, there
might be correlation between observations of the same group. We esti-
mate an econometric model22 by adopting a regression model with clustered
standard errors to account for the above-mentioned correlations, following
Ku¨bler and Mu¨ller (2002) and Dal Bo´ (2005).
If the variable of interest is the incidence of economic collusion, then
yrgs = 1 if in round r ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Rgs}, group g ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Gs} in session
s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S} colluded, and yrgs = 0 otherwise. The variable y is defined
similarly if we consider whether a group coordinated on the same collusive
price. If we look at market prices, then yrgs is the market price in round
r of group g in session s. Differences between treatments are tested in a
pairwise fashion. Every treatment is run twice, thus S = 4. Since we have
16 or 18 subjects in each session, each subject is matched with 8 or 9 other
subjects. This implies that Gs ∈ {64, 81} is the number of groups that
played in session s. It turned out that every group played at most 16 rounds
(see Table B.1), thus Rgs ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 16} is the number of rounds played by
group g in session s.
We estimate the following regression model with clustered standard er-
rors at the group level to test for differences in the variable y between treat-
ments a and b:
yrgs = β0 + β1treatmentgs + rgs, (A.1)
22Note that the session average of the variable of interest would be one independent
observation. Thus, we would have two independent observations per treatment. The
Mann-Whitney U test is only defined for at least 3 independent observations per treatment.
Therefore, non-parametric tests cannot be used.
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where β0 and β1 are coefficients to be estimated, rgs are normally dis-
tributed errors, and treatmentgs is a dummy that equals 1 if group g in
session s participated in treatment a, and 0 otherwise.
Model (A.1) allows for possible correlations between the errors rgs over
rounds r for a given group g in session s. Furthermore, we assume that the
errors of group g and group g′ 6= g in session s are not correlated, and that
the errors of group g in session s and session s′ 6= s are not correlated. In
particular, the assumptions on the errors are
E [rgs|xrgs] =0 (A.2)
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The corresponding formula for the robust covariance matrix (Cameron et























g=1Rgs is the total number of observations, k = 2
the number of regressors, G =
∑S
s=1Gs the total number of groups, X
the (N × 2)-matrix of regressors, ugs =
∑Rgs
r=1 rgsxrgs, rgs = yrgs − x′rgsβˆ,
xrgs = [1, treatmentrgs] the (2 × 1)-vector of independent variables for the





vector of coefficient estimates.
We estimate (A.1) using logit regression when looking at the incidence
of economic collusion and the incidence of price coordination. We use linear
regression when looking at market prices. All statistical tests reported in
Section 5 are for the relevant no-treatment effect versus the two-sided alter-
native using z-tests with logit regression or t-tests with linear regression.
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A.2 Individual Level
We also report on a few results on the individual level. At the level of
the follower we are interested in the percentage of followers which set a
lower/higher price than the leader. At the level of the leader we are inter-
ested in how often the leader sets a certain price, and the average price set.
Differences between treatments are tested in a pairwise fashion as in (A.1),
but the errors are clustered at the individual level instead of the group level.
B Session Details
Table B.1 provides detailed information on each session. We performed a
binomial goodness-of-fit test to test the hypothesis that the continuation
probability was binomially distributed with a 70% probability of continua-
tion. The hypothesis was not rejected (rejection probability of 30.8%).
Table B.1: Number of rounds played during each match, and average, min-
imum and maximum earnings, for all sessions.
Treatment Match Earnings
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Average Min Max
SimEqual 4 7 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 24 e8.65 e8.00 e9.40
SimEqual 3 2 7 1 2 10 2 2 1 30 e10.44 e9.15 e13.10
SimUnequal 1 4 4 3 4 3 1 6 3 29 e9.47 e7.45 e11.30
SimUnequal 1 5 9 1 2 1 2 7 2 30 e9.47 e7.65 e11.40
Follower30 5 6 4 1 1 1 1 2 1 22 e9.24 e7.55 e11.65
Follower30 1 7 4 4 3 7 5 9 1 41 e12.64 e10.10 e18.10
Follower50 16 2 3 15 1 3 5 2 - 47 e17.73 e11.70 e24.60
Follower50 1 9 2 8 1 3 4 3 4 35 e13.88 e10.15 e16.95
Follower70 6 5 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 24 e10.68 e7.30 e14.95
Follower70 4 6 15 4 5 3 1 3 - 41 e13.58 e9.00 e20.65
There were 18 participants in each session. A dash ‘-’ in match 9 indicates that the
corresponding session had only 16 participants.
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C Distribution of Prices per Treatment
Tables C.1 up to C.5 provide information per treatment on the distribution
of prices chosen by every subject across all rounds and active groups.
Table C.1: Distribution (%) of prices chosen in SimEqual across all rounds
and active groups (N=486).
Subject 1 Subject 2 Total
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 16.1 8.8 6.0 2.5 3.5 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.2 29.0
4 3.1 6.0 3.7 1.0 1.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 1.2 11.9
5 4.3 7.4 4.1 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.1 19.1
6 4.3 3.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.2 1.4 14.8
7 1.0 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.0 1.9 10.5
8 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 1.2 5.1
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.4
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
11 0.2 0.0 0.6
12 2.3 6.2
Total 16.1 11.9 16.3 17.9 13.6 6.0 4.1 2.3 1.0 10.9 100.0
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Table C.2: Distribution (%) of prices chosen in SimUnequal across all
rounds and active groups (N=531).
Subject 30% Subject 70% Total
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 24.3 5.5 2.1 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 35.4
4 5.3 5.5 4.1 2.3 1.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.4 20.2
5 1.7 1.7 3.8 3.0 2.3 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 13.8
6 1.1 2.1 3.2 2.8 1.9 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 12.8
7 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.2 7.5
8 0.8 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.8
9 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3
10 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.9
11 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1
12 1.1 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 2.3
Total 36.5 16.8 16.8 13.0 7.7 2.3 1.5 1.5 0.9 3.0 100.0
Table C.3: Distribution (%) of prices chosen in Follower30 across all
rounds and active groups (N=567).
Leader Follower Total
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 39.0 3.5 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.2 7.2 53.3
4 4.1 2.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 7.1
5 0.0 4.4 1.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 7.1
6 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 5.1
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.9
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.1 0.4 4.6
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 9.0 4.4 13.8
Total 43.0 10.2 5.8 3.7 4.1 2.7 2.8 4.4 10.2 13.1 100.0
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Table C.4: Distribution (%) of prices chosen in Follower50 across all
rounds and active groups (N=691).
Leader Follower Total
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 23.2 1.5 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 3.9 29.4
4 1.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 5.6
5 0.3 1.3 3.9 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 6.4
6 0.0 0.0 0.9 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 5.5
7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.2
8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 3.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.6
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.9 0.1 0.0 5.8
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7 2.5 0.0 4.2
12 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 4.9 25.5 30.7
Total 25.3 6.4 5.1 5.1 3.8 4.2 4.5 7.5 7.5 30.7 100.0
Table C.5: Distribution (%) of prices chosen in Follower70 across all
rounds and active groups (N=544).
Leader Follower Total
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
3 19.9 2.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.3 3.7 29.8
4 5.7 2.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.9 10.7
5 0.0 4.0 4.4 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 9.7
6 0.0 0.0 4.6 4.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 10.7
7 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.4 1.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 5.3
8 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.4 2.6 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 6.4
9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 2.2
10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.4 1.1 0.0 5.5
11 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.7 2.6 1.3 7.7
12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.2 7.5 12.0




You are going to participate in an experiment on market decision making.
We will first read the instructions aloud. Then you will have time to read
them on your own. The instructions are identical for all participants. After
reading, there is the possibility to ask questions individually. Please refrain
from talking during the entire experiment.
The experiment consists of separate games. Each game has the same struc-
ture. You will play each game with a different person. You play at most
once with the same person during the entire experiment. During one game
you will play with the same player. Together, you and that other person
form a group. You will never learn who the other player is.
Before the experiment starts, we randomly determine whether you are an
A-player or a B-player. During the entire experiment you will keep this role.
An A-player will always play with a B-player, and vice versa.
In this experiment you can earn points. The number of points you earn
depends on the decisions made by you and those made by the other player
in your group. At the beginning of the experiment, you receive 75 points
in your account. At the end of each game, the points that you earned in
that game will be added to your account. At the end of the experiment the
number of points in your account will be converted to euros, at a rate of
e0.07 per point.
The experiment is expected to last for approximately 75 minutes.
Rules of a Game
During a game you play with the same person. A game consists of several
rounds. The number of rounds is random. After every round a number from
1, 2, 3, up to and including 100 is drawn by a computer. If the number is
smaller than or equal to 70, a new round starts. If, however, it is higher than
70, the game ends. Thus, there is a probability of 70% that a new round
of a game will be played and a probability of 30% that the game ends. If a
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game ends a new game starts. A new game will be played with a different
person. Hence, in each game you meet a new person.
Rules in a Round
Each round of a game consists of four steps. These steps are the same every
round.
Step 1: pricing decision A-player
The A-player chooses one of the following prices:
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
Step 2: pricing decision B-player
After the A-player has chosen his price, the B-player learns the price chosen
by the A-player in step 1. Next, the B-player chooses one of the following
prices:
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
You and the other player receive the following number of points:
• If your price is lower than the price chosen by the other player, you re-
ceive a number of points equal to your price. The other player receives
0 points.
• If your price is the same as the price chosen by the other player, the
A-player receives a number of points equal to 30% of his price. The
B-player receives a number of points equal to 70% of his price.
• If your price is higher than the price chosen by the other player, you
receive 0 points. The other player receives a number of points equal
to his price.
The number of points you receive can be found in Table 1. This table is
added to the instructions. Table 1 reads as follows. The possible prices of
the A-player are indicated next to the rows. The possible prices of the B-
player are indicated above the columns. In the cell at which row and column
intersect, the number of points the A-player receives is up to the left and
the number of points the B-player receives is down to the right.
Examples
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• Suppose that the A-player chooses a price of 6, and the B-player
chooses a price of 8. In Table 1 you move down until you reach the
row which has 6 on the left of it. Then, you move to the column
with 8 above it. You see that the A-player receives 6 points, while the
B-player receives 0 points.
• Suppose that the A-player chooses a price of 9, and the B-player
chooses a price of 9. In Table 1 you move down until you reach the
row which has 9 on the left of it. Then, you move to the column with
9 above it. You see that the A-player receives 2.7 points, while the
B-player receives 6.3 points.
• Suppose that the A-player chooses a price of 11, and the B-player
chooses a price of 7. In Table 1 you move down until you reach the
row which has 11 on the left of it. Then, you move to the column
with 7 above it. You see that the A-player receives 0 points, while the
B-player receives 7 points.
Please make sure you understand Table 1 and also make sure that it is in
line with the instructions above.
Step 3: summary of round
After the B-player has chosen his price, the A-player learns the price chosen
by the B-player in step 2. The number of points you have received will also
be displayed. Throughout the experiment, there will also be a box on your
screen where you can observe the prices chosen by you and the other player
in previous rounds during a game.
Step 4: continuation outcome
The drawn number is displayed. Remember that if the number is smaller
than or equal to 70, a new round of a game starts. If, however, it is higher
than 70, the game ends.
End of experiment
After the last game has been played, the experiment ends. You receive a
message on your screen that no further game will take place. At the end of
the experiment, the total number of points in your account will be converted
at a rate of e0.07 per point. Before being paid in private, you have to hand
in the instructions.
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After the experiment, please do not discuss the content of the
experiment with anyone, including people who did not participate.
Please refrain from talking throughout the experiment.
Thank you very much for participating and good luck!
Table 1
Price chosen by B-player


















0.9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4
0 1.2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
3 2.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
5
0 0 1.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
3 4 3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6
0 0 0 1.8 6 6 6 6 6 6
3 4 5 4.2 0 0 0 0 0 0
7
0 0 0 0 2.1 7 7 7 7 7
3 4 5 6 4.9 0 0 0 0 0
8
0 0 0 0 0 2.4 8 8 8 8
3 4 5 6 7 5.6 0 0 0 0
9
0 0 0 0 0 0 2.7 9 9 9
3 4 5 6 7 8 6.3 0 0 0
10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 10
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 7 0 0
11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3 11
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 7.7 0
12
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.6
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 8.4
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